Defeating Insurgencies

The United States military is the most advanced and powerful fighting force in the history of mankind. In major combat operations over the last several years, the United States has achieved victory in a matter of days or even hours. Our enemies know they will never be able to beat us in conventional warfare. Therefore, they must adapt their strategy to advance their cause. As a result, modern conflicts are shifting towards irregular warfare.

What we face currently in Iraq is an insurgency. Simply put, insurgencies seek to weaken and replace a government. According to the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual, these are the goals of the insurgency in Iraq:
 – sow disorder
 – incite sectarian violence
 – weaken the government
 – kill government and opposition leaders
 – fix and intimidate police and military forces, limiting their ability to
    respond to attacks
 – create government repression.

Essentially, all an insurgency needs to do is survive. Insurgents lack the firepower of their opponents, so the fight becomes an endurance contest. If they can inflict enough damage on the civilian population, the government, and the forces opposing them, the support of the counterinsurgency can be broken. Recently, this was the case in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Americans are unwilling to accept anything but quick and decisive victory. Therefore, our opponents know that it may only be a matter of time before we “cut and run.” For instance, following the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia, we taught the world that our nation was unable to withstand casualties. After the deaths of 19 soldiers, we withdrew from Somalia. Insurgents learned it was not necessary to defeat the United States on the battlefield. All they have to do is weaken the American resolve. Think about the current situation in Iraq: members of our own Congress are trying to impose deadlines on our military. Now al-Qaeda knows that it only needs to keep up the violence until September, arming our anti-war politicians with numbers suggesting the surge is a failed strategy. They simply kill time until the Americans leave.

The problem that we face in Iraq is that our military alone cannot defeat the insurgency. We largely accomplished our mission over four years ago when President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. At that point, the Iraqis should have begun to stand up and take over. They did not, and that is why we are in this difficult situation. The Iraqis themselves needed to establish and support a legitimate government while ceasing their active or passive support of the insurgency. In some ways, this is beginning to happen, but it may be too late. We are there to support their government, not do all of the dirty work and sacrifice ourselves.

So how does the insurgency “stack the deck” against the superior American forces? Our firepower is far superior to theirs. In order to marginalize our firepower, they take advantage of our rules of engagement by operating amongst civilians. They do not have to follow any laws or treaties to conduct their operations as we do. They can carry out their objectives and then blend in with the general population, making the task of identifying the fighters nearly impossible. Since the insurgents do not wear a uniform, they can disguise their casualties as civilian casualties. When the news media reports on collateral damage and civilian casualties, it not only hurts support here at home, it also provides increased recruitment for their cause. T.E. Lawrence said, “The printing press is the greatest weapon in the arsenal of the modern commander.”

How does the counterinsurgency defeat the insurgents? Before deploying our forces, we must have good intelligence. Cultural and political awareness can be just as important as intelligence on the insurgents. Napoleon failed to take those factors into consideration for his campaign to occupy Spain in 1808. Instead of the cakewalk Napoleon expected, it took six years an four times the number of troops he originally anticipated. Effective intelligence provides effective operations and vice versa. Counterinsurgency operations are an uphill battle, and the insurgents usually have the initiative. Insurgents are continually adapting and looking for weaknesses to exploit. To win the fight, we must learn from our enemy and adapt, keeping our strategy fluid.

Once in theater, you secure the population. High levels of violence benefits the insurgents as people become less willing to fight back. Reduce the violence to the point where local law enforcement can protect the civilians. Advisors must train the military and police forces in counterinsurgency operations. If the host nation’s police or military units are competent, you build support among the population if they carry out operations against the insurgents. It can be just as important to see who is carrying out an operation as much as how successful it was carried out. T. E. Lawrence said, “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly.” The point of the counterinsurgency is to support the host nation until it can support itself. Doing too much can be counterproductive, as it was for us in South Vietnam. Over time, the host nation’s security forces will be able to operate on their own, with our forces in backup roles such as fire support and quick reaction forces.

We then help establish basic services such as water, utilities, schools, and medical care. If the populace work on such projects, they are far less likely to join the insurgents. Meanwhile, we carry out offensive operations. While it is usually impractical to kill or capture all of the insurgents, we can cut off their reinforcements and supply chain. In Iraq, 80 percent of the insurgents are from foreign countries. Controlling the borders would isolate the terrorists while we hunt them down. The sooner the counterinsurgency is over, the better. The longer a force remains in the host nation, the more the population views them as an occupying force. Unfortunately, insurgencies may take years to control and sometimes it can be very difficult to observe progress.

The most important aspect of counterinsurgency is gaining and maintaining the support of the population. Military operations are important, but not as important as the development of a legitimate government. Conducting a campaign is futile if you cannot win the hearts and minds of the people you seek to liberate.

©COPYRIGHT 2007 UNTO THE BREACH MEDIA